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I n the 1970s and early 1980s, James Keeg-stra, a high school teacher in Alberta, Canada, tainted his instruction with anti-
Semitic ideas (Queen v. Keegstra, 713). He 
taught his students that Jews were money-
mongers, infant killers, and power seekers; 
that they caused economic difficulties, wars, 
and social chaos; and that they manufactured 
the Holocaust to garner sympathy. He required 
his students to reflect his ideas on exams or 
suffer low grades (714). In 1982, Keegstra was 
prosecuted under Canada's criminal hate 
speech provision (713). That provision 
imposed liability on anyone "who, by commu-
nicating statements, other than in private con-
versation, willfully promote[d] hatred against 
any identifiable group" (713, 715 (quoting 
Criminal Code, RS.C., ch. C-46 (1985) (Can.))). 
After being convicted, Keegstra appealed to 
the Alberta Court of Appeal, arguing that the 
hate speech provision violated the Canadian 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms (Queen v. 
Keegstra, 714), which recognizes freedom of 
expression as a fundamental freedom 
(Constitution Act 1982, § 2). When the Court of 
Appeal accepted Keegstra's claim, the Crown 
appealed (Queen v. Keegstra, 714). The 
Canadian Supreme Court then set out to deter-
mine the constitutionality of Canada's hate 
speech law. Based on an elaborate balancing 
test, the Court concluded that the law was con-
stitutional (795). The Court thus upheld a crim-
inal limitation on Keegstra's freedom of 
expression. 
In a similar case two years later, the United 
States Supreme Court invalidated a hate 
speech ordinance because it violated the First 
Amendment (R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 
Minnesota 1992, 377). The petitioner (the party 
bringing the appeal) in R.A. V. v. City of St. Paul, 
Minnesota had allegedly burned a cross on a 
black family's lawn and had been prosecuted 
under St. Paul, Bias-Motivated Crime 
Ordinance (380). The ordinance criminalized 
placing "on public or private property a sym-
bol, object, appellation, characterization or 
graffiti . . . which one knows or has reason to 
know arouses anger, alarm or resentment in 
others on the basis of race, color, creed, religion 
or gender" (380 (quoting St. Paul Bias-
Motivated Crime Ordinance, St. Paul, 
Minnesota, Legis. Code § 292.02 (1990))). 
Petitioner claimed that the ordinance itself, not 
simply the way it was applied, violated the 
First Amendment. While the trial court accept-
ed the petitioner's claim, the Minnesota 
Supreme Court upheld the ordinance as a legit-
imate limitation on fighting words (R.A.V. v. 
City of St. Paul, 380), which Chaplins(cy v. New 
Hampshire had defined as words that "by their 
very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an 
immediate breach of the peace" (Chaplinsky v. 
New Hampshire 1942, 572). The United States 
Supreme Court concluded, however, that the 
ordinance, though applicable only to fighting 
words, was an unconstitutional content-based 
infringement on First .Amendment rights 
(RA.V. v. City of St. Paul, 383-85). The Court 
thus protected a petitioner's freedom of speech 
rights and reached a result different from that 
of the Canadian Supreme Court. 
This paper seeks to better understand the 
Canadian Supreme Court's approach to limita-
tions on free speech. The paper a~opts a limit-
ed comparative perspective; that is, it uses the 
United States' s approach to free speech limita-
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Canada uses a balancing approach that locates 
free speech rights and limitations in the same 
source-the values of a free and democratic 
society-and thus is more willing to limit 
individual free speech rights in favor of social 
interests. 
tions as found in R.A. V. as a reference point to 
illustrate how the Canadian approach has been 
more amenable to limitations on free speech. 
To that end, section one outlines the tests that 
the United States and Canadian Supreme 
Courts used in determining whether the hate 
speech regulations they addressed were consti-
tutional. Section one first describes how the 
United States protects individual speech rights 
by limiting content-based regulation even of 
speech that under the Constitution may be pro-
scribed. Section one also notes how Canada 
uses a balancing approach that locates free 
speech rights and limitations in the same 
source--the values of a free and democratic 
society-and thus is more willing to limit 
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individual free speech rights in favor of social 
interests. Section two then suggests four rea-
sons why the Canadian Court may have adopt-
ed a test more agreeable to limiting freedom of 
expression: namely, the text of the Canadian 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Canada's histor-
ical experience in protecting fundamental 
rights, the harms the Canadian court consid-
ered in balancing individual and social inter-
ests, and Canada's international legal obliga-
tions. Section two does not 
purport to survey 
all influences that 
may have led the 
Canadian Supreme 
Court to its more 
restrictive ap-
proach, nor does 
the section pretend 
to prove that the 
Court was affected 
by the reasons 
offered. Instead, 
section two recog-
nizes the difficulty 
of proving influ-
ence on the court 
and merely ex-
plores factors pos-
sibly affecting the 
court's decision. 
----
I. The Courts' Analyses 
The U.S. Approach 
In R.A. V. v. City of St. Paul, the United 
States Supreme Court adopted the rule that 
"content-based regulation[-regulation out-
lawing specific material-is] presumptively 
invalid" (382), because it raises "the specter 
that the Government may effectively drive cer-
tain ideas or viewpoints from the marketplace" 
(387 (quoting Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. 
Members of N.Y. State Crime Victims Board. 
502 U.S. 105, 116 (1991))). The Court recog-
nized, however, that the prohibition against 
regulations outlawing specific content is not 
absolute. Indeed, content-based restriction is 
allowed "in a few limited areas, which are 'of 
such slight value as a step to truth that any 
benefit that may be derived from them is clear-
Wmter1996 
ly outweighed by the social interest in order 
and morality"' (R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 382-
83 (quoting Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire 
1942, 572)). 
In determining whether content-based reg-
ulation will be allowed, the court applies what 
Cass Sunstein characterizes as a two-tier 
approach (8-9). The court first categorizes 
speech as either speech that may be proscribed 
or as speech that ordinarily may not be prhib-
ited. Proscribable speech is apparently identi-
fied through a bal-
ancing effort that 
weighs the ques-
tioned speech's 
usefulness in de-
terminin g truth 
against the social 
interest in order 
and morality 
(Queen v. Keegstra, 
742). This balancing 
has identified 
defamation, ob-
scenity, and fight-
ing words as types 
of speech that may 
be proscribed 
(R.A.V. v. City of St. 
Paul, 383). Speech 
about political 
issues, by contrast, ordinarily may not be pro-
hibited, though the boundaries and means of 
delineating speech that normally may not be 
proscribed are unclear (Sunstein, 9). 
Once the court categorizes a type of 
speech, the presumptive ban against content-
based regulation is applied. For both types of 
speech, the ban may be overcome when regu-
lation of content is necessary to achieve a com-
pelling state interest. Application of the ban 
thus involves a second balancing-a balancing 
of state interests and individual speech rights. 
For proscribable speech, however, the ban 
against content-based regulation may be over-
come in four additional situations: first, 
"[w]hen the basis for the content discrimina-
tion consists entirely of the very reason the 
entire class of speech at issue is proscribable, 
no significant danger of idea or viewpoint dis-
crimination exists" (R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 
388); second, when the proscribed content is 
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"associated with particular 'secondary effects' 
. . . so that the regulation is 'justified without 
reference to the content of the . . . speech"' 
(R.A.V. v. City of St Paul, 389 (quoting Renton 
v. Playtime Theatres, Inc. 475 U.S. 41, 48 (1986) 
(quoting with emphasis Virginia State Board of 
Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer 
Council, Inc. 425 U.S. 748, 771 (1976)))); third, 
when the regulation outlaws conduct in a way 
that incidentally limits "a particular content-
based subcategory of a proscribable class of 
speech" (R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 389); and 
fourth, when other regulatory reasons exist 
that do not constitute state suppression of 
ideas (390). To justify content-based regulation 
under this fourth situation "(where totally pro-
scribable speech is at issue) it may not even be 
necessary to identify any particular 'neutral' 
basis, so long as the nature of the content dis-
crimination is such that there is no realistic 
possibility that official suppression of ideas is 
afoot" (390). It is thus easier to sustain content-
based regulation of proscribable speech than of 
ordinarily nonproscribable speech. 
The surprising feature of the American 
decision is that content-based regulation of 
proscribable speech is limited at all. This result 
stands in marked contrast to the Canadian 
approach to speech regulation. Both countries 
use some type of balancing (in spite of the fact 
that the First Amendment guarantee appears 
categorical) as the review of the Canadian 
court's analysis will soon reveal. Yet, the two 
countries reach divergent conclusions: the 
United States upholds individual free speech 
rights even when proscribable speech is 
involved, while Canada attempts to eliminate 
the harms caused by hate speech by permitting 
its criminalization. 
The Canadian Approach 
The Canadian Supreme Court employs a 
two-phase analysis, characterized by balanc-
ing, to assess the constitutionality of speech 
restrictions. The first step of the Canadian 
Supreme Court's analysis is the Irwin Toy test, 
which is used to determine whether a law vio-
lates the Canadian Charter's free expression 
guarantee (Queen v. Keegstra, 728). Under the 
Irwin Toy test, the court makes two inquiries. 
First, it asks "whether the activity [being pro-
hibited by the statute] ... falls within the 
protected" sphere of freedom of expression 
(729). "If the activity [being prohibited] con-
veys or attempts to convey a meaning, it has 
expressive content and [therefore] ... falls 
within the scope of the guarantee' ... irre-
spective of the particular meaning . . . 
sought to be conveyed" (729 (quoting Irwin 
Toy Ltd. v. Quebec (Attorney General). [1989] 
1 S.C.R. 927, 969)). Thus, as under the 
American analysis, freedom of expression is 
broadly protected, at least initially. 
If the court determines that the prohibited 
activity falls within the scope of the free 
expression guarantee, the court performs the 
second inquiry, asking "whether the purpose 
of the impugned government action is to 
restrict freedom of expression" (Queen v. 
Keegstra, 729). If the government action 
restricts an expressive activity, the Charter's 
free expression guarantee is not violated (729), 
unless it is shown "that the activity supports 
rather than undermines the principles and val-
ues upon which freedom of expression is 
based" (730). Consequently, the government 
can restrict activities at the periphery of free 
expression values as long as it does so inciden-
tally and not purposefully. This standard 
opens the door for speech limitations. 
The second phase of the Canadian analysis 
involves a balancing that further accommo-
dates limitations of expression. Labeled the 
Oakes test (735), this second phase seeks to 
determine "whether a limit on a right or free-
dom can be demonstrably justified in a free 
and democratic society" under section 1 of the 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (734-
35). The Oakes test itself has two prongs. The 
first prong requires that the governmental limit 
on free speech "[have] an objective of pressing 
and substantial concern in a free and democra-
tic society" (735). This prong gives great 
weight to the needs of Canadian society. In 
Keegstra, for example, the hate speech provision 
was found to have a pressing social purpose, in 
part because the provision Wal:! adopted in 
response to studies indicating that "hate pro-
paganda . . . was not insignificant" in 
Canada (745) and because hate propaganda 
threatened grave individual and social injury 
(745-48). Thus, while the R.A. V. Court gave 
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little weight to the negative effects of hate 
speech as a justification for content-based 
restriction, Canada's Keegstra analysis cast 
individual and social harm as a compelling 
counterweight to freedom of speech. 
The Canadian analysis also balances the 
individual and social interests in free speech 
under the second prong of the Oakes test. The 
second prong requires "proportionality 
between the objective" and the governmental 
action in question (735). To fulfill this propor-
tionality requirement, governmental action 
must satisfy three additional requirements. 
First, there must be a rational · connection 
between the means chosen and the legislative 
Wmter1996 
to uphold a statute even though less restrictive 
options exist. 
Third, the effect of the act must be propor-
tional to its objective (735). Regulation cannot 
"present so grave a limitation upon [a Charter} 
guarantee . . . as to outweigh the benefits to 
be gained from [the] measure" (786). Under the 
proportionality inquiry, as under the minimal 
impairment analysis, the relation of the expres-
sion in question to "the values underlying the 
guarantee of freedom of speech" apparently 
influences the weight the expression is given 
(787). The less closely related the expression is 
to the values underlying free speech, the more 
likely the infringement will be held propor-
---------------------------------------------------------------- tionaltotheinfring~ 
While it is impossible to pinpoint why Canada adopted a more speech-
restricuve approach, four reasons eem plausible: the constitutional text 
.which guided the Court's inquiry, Canada's historical treatment of 
fundamental rights, the harms the Ca_1_1fJ!,lian Court considered in 
peiforming its balancing, and Canada's international egal obligations. 
ment's objective. 
If a govern-
mental act survives 
both prongs of the 
Oakes test, "the in-
fringement [on] ... 
freedom of expres-
sion as guaranteed by 
[ the Charter is] up-
---------------------------------------------------------------- held as a reasonable 
objective (735). If an act does not further its 
objective, it is deemed irrational and fails this 
requirement . 
Second, the means chosen for achieving 
the objective should minimally impair the con-
stitutional freedom or right (735). While this 
minimal impairment language would seem to 
allow only restrictions that can be character-
ized as necessary, in fact the requirement is less 
stringent. The requirement does "not operate 
in every instance so as to force the government 
to rely upon only the mode of intervention 
least intrusive of a Charter right or freedom" 
(784). The government may choose "a more 
restrictive measure, either alone or as part of a 
larger programme of action, if that measure is 
not redundant, furthering the objective in ways 
that alternative responses could not, and is in 
all other respects proportionate to a valid" aim 
of the Canadian Charter, section 1 (785). Thus, 
while the United States Supreme Court 
requires that content-based regulation be nec-
essary to achieve a compelling state interest, 
the Canadian Supreme Court appears willing 
limit prescribed by law in a free and democrat-
ic society" (787). The Oakes test leaves ample 
room for such reasonable limits. Not only does 
the test mandate a balancing of freedom of 
expression against other concerns, but the test 
operates on the assumption that both the guar-
antees and the limits of Charter rights and free-
doms flow from "[t]he underlying values of a 
free and democratic society'' (736). By holding 
that these values form the foundation for 
Charter guarantees, as well as for the limits on 
those guarantees, the test establishes social 
needs and values as the standard for identify-
ing and limiting rights. As a result, individual 
rights are deprived of independent value. They 
are accorded weight only to the degree they 
correspond to and support social values. De-
priving individual rights of autonomous pro-
tection provides the Court significant leeway to 
limit such rights. Thus, the Keegstra Court 
found the prohibited speech "not closely linked 
to the rationale underlying" the free expression 
guarantee and consequently proscribable (762), 
in contrast to the Court in R.A. V. 
-38-
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However, lest it appear from the cases ana-
lyzed that the Canadian and American 
approaches to criminal speech regulation are 
more divergent than they actually are, it 
should be noted here that the United States 
Supreme Court did not reach the merits of the 
St. Paul ordinance, but held that it was invalid 
on its face because it was unconstitutionally 
content-based (Sajo 1995). Like Canada, the 
United States has in fact been willing to sustain 
criminalization of certain speech, such as the 
counseling of murder, under the First 
Amendment (Sajo; Greenawalt 1989, 191). 
Moreover, the United States has not adopted a 
single approach for addressing speech regula-
tion; hence, the R.A. V. case does not provide a 
complete picture of the extent to which the 
United States will sustain free speech limita-
tions. Nevertheless, as the above descriptions 
of the American and Canadian approaches to 
hate speech reveal, the Canadian court has 
been more willing than the U.S. court to limit 
free expression, at le~t µ1 this nan:ow arena. 
II. Possible Reasons for 
Canada's Relative Willingness 
to Limit Free Speech 
While it is impossible to pinpoint why 
Canada adopted a more speech-restrictive 
approach, four reasons seem plausible: the 
constitutional text that guided the court's 
inquiry, Canada's historical treatment of fun-
damental rights, the harms the Canadian court 
considered in performing its balancing, and 
Canada's international legal obligations. This 
paper now turns to an exploration of these 
influences. 
The Text of the Canadian Charter 
of Rights and Freedoms 
While America's First Amendment 
expresses a facially absolute prohibition 
against governmental infringement on free 
speech, the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms contains a free expression guarantee 
that may be limited and even ignored by the 
federal and provincial governments. Section 2 
of the Charter guarantees that "[e]veryone has 
the following fundamental freedoms: . . . 
freedom of thought, belief, opinion and expres-
sion" (Constitution Act 1982, § 2). Section 1, 
however, provides that the rights and free-
doms guaranteed by the Charter are subject "to 
such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can 
be demonstrably justified in a free and democ-
ratic society"(§ 1). Section 1 confines infringe-
ments on free expression to those that are rea-
sonable and demonstrably justifiable, yet it 
clearly accommodates limits. The Canadian 
court in Keegstra therefore began from a posi-
tion that presupposed the possibility of gov-
ernmental infringements on individual free 
expression. Beginning from such a position, it 
is unstartling that the court was willing to sus-
tain some speech limitations. This is not to sug-
gest that it is surprising that the U.S. court has 
upheld free speech limitations under a facially 
unconditional bar against speech regulation, 
but only to suggest that it is easier to sustain 
restrictions when the possibility of limits is 
expressly recognized by the very document 
that guarantees the right. 
Not only does the Canadian Charter permit 
limits on Charter freedoms, under section 33 it 
authorizes "Parliament or the legislature of a 
province[, within certain limits, to] expressly 
declare in an Act of Parliament or of the legis-
lature . . . that the Act or · a provision thereof 
shall operate notwithstanding [the guarantees] 
included in section 2" (§ 33). Section 33 did not 
apply in Keegstra as the hate speech provision 
in question was not expressly exempt from the 
reach of section 2. Yet the section may have 
influenced the Keegstra court. The section 
seems to constitutionalize the notion that legis-
latures are supreme and can even proscribe 
individual rights in the exercise of their sover-
eignty (Marx 1982, 71). The mere presence of 
the provision in the Canadian Constitution, 
regardless of its immediate relevance to the 
case at hand, may have led the court to defer to 
the legislature. In sum, the Charter's textual 
recognition of legislative supremacy and of the 
proscribability of fundamental rights may well 
have contributed to the court's willingness to 
uphold free expression limitations. 
-39-
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Canada's Historical Treatment 
of Fundamental Rights 
In pursuing its more speech-restrictive 
approach, the Canadian court may also have 
been influenced by Canada's historical treat-
ment of fundamental freedoms which reveals 
only recent recognition of speech as an explicit 
constitutional right, a lack of independent pro-
tection for fundamental rights, and an accep-
When claims involving fundamental freedoms 
were brought before Canadian courts under the 
British North America Act of 1867, the courts 
had no consti-tutional basis for protecting those 
rights. 
tance of parliamentary supremacy over indi-
vidual freedoms. 
Canada's first constitutional document 
was the British North America Act of 1867. The 
BNA Act, later titled the Constitution Act, 1867 
(Hogg 1985, 4), sought to carry out the desire of 
"the Pro.vinces of Canada, Nova Scotia, and 
New Brunswick . . . to be federally united 
into One Dominion under the Crown of the 
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, 
with a Constitution similar in Principle to tJ:tat 
of the United Kingdom" (Constitution Act 
1867, preamble). The act fulfilled two purpos-
es: it "established the rules of federalism," allo-
cating power between the federal Parliament 
and the provincial legislatures (Hogg, 2), and it 
gave Canada a constitution similar to that of 
England. The act did not, however, attempt to 
create a constitutional system of fundamental 
freedoms for the dominion (2). Under the act's 
federalist allocations, neither the federal nor 
the provincial legislatures "were . . . intend-
ed to serve as the instruments for the protec-
tion of fundamental rights" (Cotler 1982, 126). 
Instead, by prescribing for Canada a constitu-
tion similar to that of England, the act adopted 
the English theory of parliamentary sovereign-
ty, which meant that parliament was empow-
ered to enact whatever laws it deemed neces-
sary, including laws that limited fundamental 
freedoms such as speech (129). The BNA Act 
Wmter1996 
thus provided no guarantees for individual 
rights and even recognized the constitutionali-
ty of legislative infringements. 
As a result, when claims involving funda-
mental freedoms were brought before Canad-
ian courts under the act, the courts had no con-
stitutional basis for protecting those rights. The 
courts could look only to principles of federal-
ism and parliamentary supremacy expounded 
by the act. Fundamental rights claims were 
therefore often decided within the framework 
of legal federalism (124). Legal federalism 
assumed the supremacy of parliament (129) 
and focused the courts, not on "limitations on 
the exercise of [legislative] power," but on "the 
division of powers between the federal and 
provincial governments." When "federal or 
provincial law appeared to offend . . . civil 
liberties, the central question . . . became . . 
. [whether] the alleged denial of civil liberties 
[was] within the legislative power of the 
offending government" (124). If the denial fit 
within the power of the enacting government, 
the denial was upheld (124). Only if the denial 
fell outside the enacting legislature's authority 
was the denial declared unconstitutional, not 
because it limited an individual's fundamental 
rights but because the legislation violated the 
federalist division of authority. 
For example, in Union Colliery Co. v. Bryden 
the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council 
was presented with a provincial law that for-
bade employing Chinese individuals in subter-
ranean coal mines (Cotler, 125 (citing Union 
Colliery Co. Ltd. v. Bryden. [1899) A.C. 580 
(P.C.))). The Judicial Committee found the act 
unconstitutional but not because it was racial-
ly discriminatory. The act was unconstitutional 
because it was without the legislative compe-
tence of the provincial legislature: the act dealt 
with alien or non-naturalized citizens, and 
matters of naturalization and alienism were 
within the federal, not provincial domain 
(Cotler, 125). 
While the legal federalism analysis served 
to protect individual rights in Bryden, the analy-
sis led to affirmation of an infringement on 
speech rights in Nova ScoHa Board of Censors v. 
McNeil. In McNeil, a provincial censorship law 
had been used to prevent exhibition of a film 
(Re Nova Scotia Board of Censors and McNeil 
1978, 1, 4-5). The Canadian Supreme Court 
-40-
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upheld the law because it was "in pith and sub-
stance directed to property and civil rights" and 
therefore lay within the provincial legislature's 
authority (2). Even the dissenting judge, Chief 
Justice Laskin, who recognized the infringe-
ment on individual rights "would have invali-
dated the legislation on the grounds that it 
[was] 'within the exclusive power of the 
Parliament of Canada under its enumerated 
authority to legislate in relation to the criminal 
law,'" not on the grounds that it violated funda-
mental freedom (Cotler, 127 (quoting Re Nova 
Scotia Board of Censors and McNeil 1978, 14)). 
While the legal federalism analysis 
appears to blatantly ignore the independent 
weight of fundamental rights, the analysis may 
in fact have been the only means of protecting 
fundamental rights that would have been con-
sistent with existing law (Cotler, 126). As men-
tioned, the BNA Act contained no explicit 
guarantee of fundamental rights; instead the 
act incorporated the rule of parliamentary 
supremacy with its notion that Parliament 
could limit rights almost at will (126-27). As a 
result, the courts may have found legal feder-
alism to be the most appropriate or indeed the 
only means whereby they could respect the 
BNA Act and its attendant principle of legisla-
tive sovereignty while still providing some 
protection for fundamental freedoms (127). 
limited the Bill's effectiveness. The Bill was 
enacted as a piece of federal legislation applic-
able only to federal law and subject to amend-
ment through the normal legislative process 
(Hogg, 639-40). In addition, instead of seizing 
upon the Bill's explicit guarantees, the 
Canadian Supreme Court continued to neglect 
fundamental freedom issues and was appar-
ently influenced by legal federalism in decid-
ing the validity of federal limits on individual 
rights under the Bill (Cotler, 130-31). Con-
sequently, before the Charter was adopted, 
Canadian courts "[had] never really confront~ 
ed the system of freedom of expression head-
on; nor [had] the courts grappled with the fun-
damental value claims and collisions that have 
dominated American case-law" (134). 
Canada's pre-Charter constitutional history 
reveals first the relative recentness of Canada's 
explicit recognition of free speech as a funda-
mental legal right, second the Supreme Court's 
reluctance to accord independent legal weight 
to fundamental rights, and third the court's 
willingness to uphold infringements on free 
speech rights by competent legislative acts. 
While the Charter altered the constitutional 
framework in which the Keegstra Court operat-
ed, the Charter did not foreclose the influence 
of these historical trends. As noted, the rule of 
parliamentary supremacy found its way into 
Wmter1996 
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Whether the courts--------------------------------
were trying to protect 
fundamental rights 
or not, the reality 
remains that under 
legal federalism 
analysis fundamental 
rights lacked inde-
pendent weight. 
Instead, rights were 
viewed as clearly 
Canada's pre-Charter constimtional history reveals first the relative 
recenmess of Canada's explicit recognition of free speech as a 
fundamental legal right, second the Supreme Court's reluctance to 
accord independent legal weight to fundamental rights, and third the 
Court's willingness to uphold infringements on free speech rights by 
competent legislative acts. 
proscribable by a leg- --------------------------------
islature in the proper exercise of its constitu-
tional authority (129). 
In 1960 Canada adopted a bill of rights 
(Hogg, 639). The Canadian Bill of Rights 
"declared that in Canada there have existed 
and shall continue to exist . . . the following 
human rights and fundamental freedoms, 
namely, ... freedom of speech" (Part I,§ 1). 
However, the form and scope of the Bill, as 
well as the manner in which it was applied, 
section 33 of the Charter and therefore 
remained part of the constitutional landscape 
in which Keegstra was decided. Similarly, the 
reluctance to give individual rights separate 
weight was consistent with the premise of sec-
tion 1 that both guarantees and limits the values 
of a democratic society. Because these historical 
practices were compatible with the Charter text 
and because they had figured so prominently 
in Canada's constitutional experience, the 
-41-
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court may well have been influenced by these 
practices in assessing the constitutionality of 
free speech regulation in Keegstra. 
The Harms the Canadian Court 
Considered 
The Court may also have reached a more 
speech-restrictive result because of the harms it 
was willing to consider in balancing the indi-
vidual's free speech rights against the needs of 
Canadian society (Sajo). Again, comparison 
with the United States approach is revealing. 
United States free speech jurisprudence has 
been heavily influenced by the Brandenburg 
clear-and-present-danger test (Greenawalt, 
188), which maintains "that the constitutional 
guarantees of free speech and free press do not 
permit a State to . . . proscribe advocacy of 
the use of force or of law violation except 
where such advocacy is directed to inciting or 
producing imminent lawless action and is ,li.ke-
ly to incite or produce such action" 
(Brandenburg v. Ohio 1969, 447). The clear-
and-present-danger paradigm permits the 
court to sustain proscription of certain speech 
only when immediate harms might otherwise 
result . 
In contrast, the Canadian balancing con-
siders long-term harm. For example, in assess-
ing whether a pressing legislative objective 
supported Keegstra's criminal hate speech pro-
vision, the Canadian court was heavily influ-
enced by the fact that hate propaganda threat-
ens "the self-dignity of target group members" 
and may result in the acceptance of "preju-
diced messages . . . with the attendant result 
of discrimination, and perhaps even violence, 
against minority groups in [Canada]" (Queen 
v. Keegstra, 748). Because the Canadian Court 
broadly considers long-term social harm, as it 
did in Keegstra, social interests are more likely 
to outweigh individual rights under the 
Canadian analysis than under the U.S. 
approach, which concentrates on 'the narrower 
category of immediate harms. Canada's more 
expansive view of constitutionally relevant 
harm appears to be a third factor influencing the 
court to uphold limits on free expression (Sajo ). 
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Canada's International Legal 
Obligations 
The Canadian court also appears influ-
enced by Canada's international legal obliga-
tions. Prior to Keegstra, Canada had committed 
to prohibit certain types of hate speech under 
two relevant treaties: the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which 
was "adopted by the United Nations in 1966 
and [has been] in force in Canada since 1976," 
and the International Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination, to which Canada was a signa-
tory member and which has been "in. force 
since 1969" (Queen v. Keegstra, 751). The 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights imposes 
on its signatories the obligation to outlaw "any 
advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred 
that constitutes incitement to discrimination, 
hostility or violence" (U.S. Department of State 
1994, International Covenant art. 20). Similarly, 
the International Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination binds states' parties to 
declare an offence punishable by law all dis-
semination of ideas based on racial superi-
ority or hatred, incitement to racial discrim-
ination, as well as all acts of violence or 
incitement to such acts against any race or 
group of persons of another colour or ethnic 
origin, and also the provision of any assis-
tance to racist activities, including the 
financing thereof. (U.N. 1970, art . 4, CJ[ a) 
Given the obligations imposed by both treaties, 
the Canadian court found that Canada was not 
only permitted but expected to prohibit ''hate-
promoting expression" as part of its "guaran-
tee of human rights" (Queen v. Keegstra, 754). 
By contrast, when R.A. V. was decided, the 
United States was a party to neither of these 
treaties (Sajo). Thus, the United States was not 
obligated to prohibit any form of hate speech. 
Since the time of R.A.V., the United States has 
ratified the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights; the covenant "entered 
into force ... for the United States 
September 8, 1992" (U.S. Department of State 
1994, Treaties in Force 350). Yet the United States 
ratified the covenant subject to a significant 
reservation: ''That Article 20 [the article requir-
ing prohibition of certain forms of hate speech] 
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does not authorize or require legislation or 
other action by the United States that would 
restrict the right of free speech and association 
protected by the Constitution and laws of the 
United States" (U.S. Congress 1992, 1(1)). U.S. 
ratification was subject to other reservations, 
understandings, and declarations that likewise 
diminish the United States's obligations under 
the covenant. For example, "Articles 1 through 
27 of the covenant are not self-executing" in 
the United States (111(1)). The effect, if any, of 
the United States's qualified ratification of the 
covenant has yet to be determined (Sajo), 
though the Initial Report of the United States 
to the U.N. Human Rights Committee indi-
cates that prohibition of some but not all 
"types of expression inciting discrimination, 
hostility or violence" -as may be required 
under article 20-would be "[im)permissible 
under the U.S. Constitution" and so could not 
be upheld in spite of the United States's ratifi-
cation of the covenant (U.S. Department of 
State 1994, Civil and Political Rights 160). The 
effect of Canada's ratification of the covenant 
and convention, on the other hand, was made 
clear by the Keegstra Court: Canada's treaty 
obligations support restriction of hate speech 
(Queen v. Keegstra, 754) and provide another 
plausible reason why the Canadian Court was 
more willing than the U.S. Supreme Court to 
limit freedom of expression. 
Conclusion 
While it is impossible to identify with cer-
tainty the cause of the Canadian Supreme 
Court's relative willingness to sustain limita-
tions on free speech, highly tenable reasons 
may be found in Canada's Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms, which recognizes the power of 
Canadian legislatures to limit and override the 
Charter's free expression guarantee; Canada's 
historical treatment of fundamental freedoms, 
which included practices and perspectives 
amenable to speech limitations; Canada's con-
sideration of long-range harms in balancing 
social needs against individual rights; and 
Canada's international obligation to proscribe 
hate propaganda. These reasons may well 
have led the Canadian Supreme Court in 
Keegstra, in contrast to the United States 
Supreme Court in R.A. V., to conclude that the 
criminalization of hate speech was a "reason-
able limit . . . demonstrably justified in 
[Canada's] free and · democratic sodety 11 · (Constitution Act 1982, § 1). · 
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